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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1024 
___________ 
 
AMAR K. BALKARAN, AKA Amar Kumar Balkaran, AKA Amar Balkaran 
 
Amar K. Balkaran, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                   Respondent  
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A096-539-788) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy Harbeck 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 14, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 20, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se petitioner Amar Balkaran seeks review of a final order of removal issued by 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons detailed below, we will 
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dismiss the petition for review in part and deny it in part. 
 Balkaran is a citizen of Guyana.  He entered the United States in 1996, and later 
became a lawful permanent resident.  However, he was subsequently convicted of several 
criminal offenses — most importantly, conspiracy to defraud the United States in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  Based on this conviction, the Department of Homeland 
Security charged him with being removable as an alien who had been convicted of an 
aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and a crime involving moral 
turpitude, see § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  Balkaran, through counsel, conceded removability.  
Further, while he had initially applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of 
removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), at the hearing before the 
Immigration Judge (IJ), he stipulated that he was not eligible for asylum or withholding 
of removal, and thus pursued only the CAT claim.  Balkaran alleged that in Guyana, due 
to his homosexuality, he had been expelled from school, beaten, arrested, and sexually 
assaulted, and that he feared that he would be tortured if he returned. 
 The IJ denied Balkaran’s application.  The IJ concluded, first, that Balkaran had 
not testified credibly about his experiences in Guyana.  Further, the IJ ruled that the 
country-conditions evidence that Balkaran provided did not establish that it was more 
likely than not that he would be tortured in Guyana.  Balkaran then appealed to the BIA, 
which dismissed his appeal.  The BIA observed that while Balkaran (now proceeding pro 
se) attempted to argue that he was entitled to withholding of removal, he was bound by 
his prior counsel’s admission that he was not eligible for that relief.  The BIA next upheld 
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the IJ’s adverse-credibility determination.  Finally, the BIA agreed with the IJ that 
Balkaran had failed to show that he was entitled to CAT relief, holding that “mere 
speculation about the potential dangers that may await an alien in the country of removal 
will not support a claim under the CAT.”  Balkaran then filed a timely petition for review 
in this Court.   
 The contours of our jurisdiction over this case depend on the correctness of the 
BIA’s conclusion that Balkaran’s federal offense qualifies as an aggravated felony.  
Balkaran does not challenge this aspect of the BIA’s opinion, see Br. at 8 (“petitioner’s 
conviction satisfied the relevant definition of aggravated felony”), but because we have 
an independent obligation to examine our jurisdiction, see Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 
652, 655 (3d Cir. 2007), we must address this issue notwithstanding Balkaran’s 
concession. 
 The BIA ruled that Balkaran’s offense was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), which includes within that category “an offense that involves fraud 
or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”  We agree with the 
BIA’s determination.  The statute under which Balkaran was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 371, 
is a divisible statute, so we may use the modified categorical approach.  See generally 
United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 389, 396 (3d Cir. 2014).  That approach permits us to 
consider the criminal judgment, see Singh v. Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 503, 512 (3d Cir. 
2012), which reveals that Balkaran was convicted under the part of § 371 that 
criminalizes conspiracy “to defraud the United States.”  This offense involves fraud or 
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deceit.  See Nijhawan v. Att’y Gen., 523 F.3d 387, 390-91 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. 
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009).  Further, the criminal judgment states that the 
loss caused by the fraud was nearly $1.5 million, which is sufficient to establish the 
requisite loss amount.  See id. at 395.  Thus, the crime qualifies as an aggravated felony, 
see Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 707 (6th Cir. 2010) (so holding), and our 
jurisdiction is consequently limited to review of constitutional claims and questions of 
law, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). 
 Turning to the substance of the case, we observe that Balkaran’s brief consists 
largely of lengthy and unattributed reproductions of decisions by various courts of 
appeals that have little relevance to his case.  Cf. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring 
briefs to contain “citations to the authorities”).  For instance, Balkaran spends seven 
pages of his brief copying, nearly verbatim, passages from Carcamo-Flores v. I.N.S., 805 
F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986), that discuss, among other things, the standards governing 
withholding of removal.  This discussion, however, skirts the key issue here.  Before the 
IJ, Balkaran’s attorney stipulated that Balkaran was ineligible for withholding of 
removal, and the BIA concluded that Balkaran was bound by that stipulation.  Balkaran 
has made no effort to challenge this aspect of the BIA’s decision, and we discern no 
error.  See Pinos-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 2008) (denying 
petition for review in similar circumstances); see also Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 
191 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Facts admitted by a party are judicial admissions that bind that party 
throughout the litigation.” (quotation marks, alternations omitted)).  Thus, to the extent 
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that Balkaran seeks review of the BIA’s refusal to consider his withholding-of-removal 
claim on the merits, we will deny his petition.   
 Further, as noted above, the BIA concluded that Balkaran was not credible.  
Balkaran has not contested that ruling in any way.  Therefore, he has waived any 
argument regarding the BIA’s credibility determination.  See Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 
F.3d 488, 495 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 Balkaran does argue, albeit without providing any meaningful discussion, that the 
BIA erred in denying his CAT claim.  The BIA concluded that Balkaran’s CAT claim 
failed because “mere speculation about the potential dangers that may await an alien in 
the country of removal will not support a claim under the CAT.”  This is a factual 
decision — that is, that Balkaran failed to establish that the torture he feared was more 
likely than not to occur — that we lack jurisdiction to review.  See Roye v. Att’y Gen., 
693 F.3d 333, 343 n.12 (3d Cir. 2012); Kaplun v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition for review to the extent that it 
challenges this aspect of the BIA’s decision.   
 Balkaran also seems to argue (this time borrowing heavily from Huynh v. Holder, 
321 F. App’x 649 (9th Cir. 2009)) that a conviction under § 371 does not qualify as a 
crime involving moral turpitude.  That issue, however, at least insofar as Balkaran raises 
it to challenge the agency’s removability determination,1 is not properly before us:  
                                              
1
 It is true that our jurisdiction to review a final order of the BIA is restricted when an 
alien is removable by virtue of a conviction for moral turpitude, Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 
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because Balkaran did not challenge that ruling (or his attorney’s concession underlying it) 
before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review it, see § 1252(d)(1), and we will dismiss 
the petition for review to the extent that it presses this claim.   
 Finally, Balkaran argues (in a claim that is directly contradicted by his criminal 
judgment) that “there is no evidentiary basis to conclude that respondent pleaded to an 
offense involving a crime listed in the title or section 18 U.S.C. § 371.”  However, he also 
failed to raise this issue before the BIA; we therefore lack jurisdiction to consider it, see 
Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120-21 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2008), and will dismiss the 
petition for review in this respect.   
 Accordingly, we will dismiss Balkaran’s petition for review in part and deny it in 
part. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2006), and, as noted above, we retain jurisdiction to consider our 
own jurisdiction.  However, given our conclusion that Balkaran’s conviction qualifies as 
an aggravated felony, we need not reach this issue.  See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 
24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings 
on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). 
